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Control of, and Access to, On-Line
Computer Data Bases: Some First





The first amendment, drafted in an era of print, has assumed
a new importance with the emergence of telecommunications
and other non-print media. A third wave of communications
technology, succeeding print, traditional broadcasting and te-
lephony, and involving the interface between the computer
and traditional forms of telecommunications, promises to raise
many new first amendment questions.
This article addresses some of these questions in the context
of what many regard to be a newly-emerging mass medium of
home and office information-retrieval. Information stored in
centralized data banks is now accessible by home computer
over telephone and cable networks, over a combination of
these networks, and through over-the-air broadcasting. The
proprietors of these data banks may be said to "publish" their
information-however ephemerally--each time an end-user re-
trieves information from their data bases. If taken seriously,
this concept of "electronic publication" raises important first
amendment questions.
After a brief introduction to the nature of the new medium,
this article discusses some of the first amendment issues in-'
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volved in access to stored information bases and the "mirror
image" problem of controlling such stored information. Be-
cause many of the potential first amendment issues involved
are attributable to the nature of the medium itself, the develop-
ment of distributed information networks is described. The ar-
ticle summarizes possible regulation of the new medium under
the Communications Act of 1934 and concludes by suggesting a
first amendment policy for electronic "publication."
II
The Nature of "Electronic Publishing"
"Electronic publishing" makes information available by re-
producing pages of text and other images on a video display
terminal or television screen. Information is usually broadcast
over the air, or transmitted through coaxial cables' or tele-
phone wires, and is decoded or processed by a small home or
office computer connected to the display screen.
Some systems provide only a one-way or "downstream" flow
of information: signals are transmitted from the source or
"head-end" computer to the end-user, but not vice versa.
These one-way networks, called "teletext" systems, merely al-
low transmission of a limited number of pages in a continuous
cycle, but the end-user may freeze or "grab" a page of particu-
lar interest and peruse it at leisure. Because information
transmitted by teletext is unreeled in a scroll-like, sequential
fashion, the end-user must wait until the page in which he is
interested appears before "grabbing" it for use. However, in-
dexing systems with individually-numbered frames allow him
simply to input the number of a frame in order to have it held
for him when it appears in the transmission cycle.
More interactive systems provide two-way communication
between the end-user and the data source. The "head-end" or
data storage computer holds a large body of retrievable infor-
mation which can be recalled by the end-user at will. Individ-
ual pages may be recalled on signal without waiting for them to
appear on the screen, as is necessary in teletext systems.
Some systems currently in use-such as the LEXIS legal re-
search service-are highly interactive, and the end-user may
1. "Coaxial cables" are insulated cables used to transmit telephone, telegraph
and television signals of high frequency. A. SMITH, GOODBYE GUTENBERG: THE NEWS-
PAPER REVOLUTION OF THE 1980's, 334 (1980).
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tailor a search of the computer's data base to suit individual
needs and to refine the search as it proceeds.2 The generic
term for this more interactive two-way system is "videotex."
Recent technological developments have strained traditional
government regulation in this area, and this strain in turn has
created a dilemma. Traditional print publishers may have con-
flicting interests as these systems "come on stream." Print
publishers have successfully defended their rights to print and
publish whatever they chose,3 and today remain exempt from
the access requirements imposed on broadcasters and com-
mon carriers.4 However, they now find themselves in a difficult
situation. On the one hand, print publishers may demand, for
reasons of economic self-interest, that owners and operators of
cable systems, space satellite transponders5 and other media
carry their messages over regulated channels. On the other
hand, those traditional print publishers who are, or will be-
come, proprietors of electronic media may feel uncomfortable
with such access requirements. Choosing what to publish, and
how and when to publish it have traditionally been among a
publisher's most cherished prerogatives.6
This dilemma is compounded by the fact that government
regulation in this area lags behind the evolution of the elec-
tronic media in question. A half-century old distinction be-
tween "broadcasting"7 and "common carriage"8 continues as
2. See A. SMITH, supra note 1, 241-317; INsTrrTTE FOR THE FUTURE/NATIONAL SCI-
ENCE FOUNDATION, TELETEXT AND VIDEOTEX IN THE UNITED STATES; Data Services Map
the Way in Labyrinths of Information, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1981, § IV, at 9, col. 1;
Viewdata, special supplement to Financial Times (London), § I, Dec. 1, 1981; The
Looming Battle Over Videotext, DUN'S REVIEW, Feb. 1981, at 58-61.
3. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
4. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976).
5. "Communications satellites have been distributing video programming in the
United States since 1975." N.Y. Times, June 9, 1975, at 25, col. 7. '"They have made
possible the economic viability of special interest networks, such as those devoted to
religion, minorities, sports, motion pictures, and cultural programming .... " Com-
ment, Direct Broadcast Satellites: Ownership and Access to the New Technology, 33
FED. COM. L.J. 245 n.1 (1981).
6. For the development and culture of publishing as an industry see L. COSER, C.
KADUSHmN & W. PowELL, BooKs: THE CULTURE AND COMMERCE OF PUBLISHING (1982).
7. A "broadcaster" is one who disseminates "radio communications intended to
be received by the public ... ." 47 U.S.C. § 153(o) (1976). "Broadcasting" is regulated
under Title I of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (1976).
8. A "common carrier" holds himself out indifferently as offering communications
services and facilities for the transmission of intelligence of the customer's own design
and choosing. National Association of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601
(D.C. Cir. 1976). Common carriage, which includes not only the conventional tele-
No. 11
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the basis for such regulation despite the fact that much of the
new technology does not fit comfortably into either category.
Furthermore, the important question of whether the "elec-
tronic publication" of information is to be described as "data
processing"9 or as "communication,"'1 remains open, although
the former may not be subject to current government regula-
tion while the latter most certainly is."
Perhaps most important are the social and economic
changes which will flow from what may accurately be de-
scribed as a change in the "topography" of information-
processing and exchange. This change, from a centralized sys-
tem of broadcasting and monopolistic common carriage to a de-
centralized, vigorously competitive and differentiated
communications marketplace, may be the most important re-
sult of the current upheaval in the structure of our national in-
formation systems.
III
Controlling the Data Base and Gaining Access to
the Network: Regulation of the Editorial
Function in Electronic
Publication
Perhaps the most important first amendment distinction be-
phone and telegraph industries, but also radio common carriers and various micro-
wave and satellite carriers, is regulated under Title II of the Communications Act. See
47 U.S.C. §§ 201-24 (1976).
9. In its initial attempt to grapple with the problem of distinguishing "communi-
cation" from "data processing," the FCC left unregulated "operations which include
the functions of storing, retrieving, sorting, merging and calculating data according to
programmed instructions." Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interde-
pendence of Computer and Communications Services and Facilities-Final Decision
and Order [hereinafter cited as First Computer Inquiry-Final Decision], 28 F.C.C.2d
261,265, 21 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1591, 1592 n.3 (1971), affd in part sub nom. GTE Service
Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973), decision on remand, 40 F.C.C.2d 293, 26 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P&F) 1727 (1973).
The FCC originally held that operations in which computers were used in a
message-switching capacity-to control the "transmission of messages, between two
or more points, via communications facilities wherein the content of the message re-
mains unaltered," would be subject to government regulation. This language was codi-
fied in 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (2) (1974). However, this distinction has been abandoned in
favor of one dividing the domain into "basic" and "enhanced" services. See infra note
91. See generally Comment, The Computer Inquiries: Mapping the Communications/
Information Processing Terrain, 33 FED. COM. L.J. 55, 62-66 (1981).
10. See supra note 9.
11. Comment, supra note 9.
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tween electronic and print media involves control over the edi-
torial function. Common carriers, for example, have almost no
editorial control over contents and must transmit the messages
of all of their customers untouched.
12
Traditional over-the-air broadcasters and proprietors of
cable systems, on the other hand, are subject to a variety of
such controls. The former are subject to a variety of federal
regulations,13 the latter to an increasingly prevalent incidence
of local controls exacted in the franchising process.14
Traditional government regulation of broadcasting has been
predicated on an alleged "scarcity" of usable channels along
the electromagnetic spectrum and by the notion that this spec-
trum is a "valuable public resource."1 5 Under this rationale,
the licensed broadcaster "is granted the free and exclusive use
of a limited and valuable part of the public domain; when he
accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable public
obligations." 6
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,17 the United States
Supreme Court pointed out that "[a] license permits broad-
casting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the
one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency
to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the
First Amendment which prevents the government from requir-
ing a licensee to share his frequency with others."' 8 The Red
Lion decision had upheld the constitutionality of the FCC's
"fairness" and "personal attack"19 rules, relying largely on the
12. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
13. For a summary of federal regulation of over-the-air broadcasting, see R. WILEY,
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, THE MEDIA AND THE COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND DEVELOPING TRENDS, NINTH ANNUAL
COMMUNICATIONS LAW INSTrrurrE 480-07 (1981).
14. See, e.g., R-Rated TV Leads to Attacks on "Cableporn " LA. Times, May 17,
1982, at 1, col. 5. Denver and Houston, for example, have excluded X-rated, but not R-
rated, programs from the franchises they have awarded for local cable service.
15. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 123
U.S. App. D.C. 328 (1966).
16. Id. at 1003.
17. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
18. 395 U.S. at 389.
19. Broadcasters are required to present programming on controversial issues of
public importance, and when they do so, to present contrasting viewpoints if one side
of a controversial issue has been broadcast. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976). See also Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974).
In addition, a person or group whose honesty or integrity is attacked on a broadcast
station generally has a right to reply to the attack. See 47 C.F.R. § 73 (1981).
No. 11
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"scarcity" rationale.20 While similar "scarcity" arguments may
be raised in the context of electronic publishing, they could
only be based on a misconception of the nature of contempo-
rary information networks.21
To be sure, early information-processing more closely resem-
bled network television broadcasting than telephone common
carriage. Computers before 1965 were huge, expensive and
often unreliable. Programming languages were difficult and
esoteric, and access to the machines was possible only through
on-site input and output devices. "Consequently, a user was
compelled to mail or otherwise physically deliver data to the
computer's location and carry the processed data back to the
site of his business." 22 Furthermore, these early computers
were often capable of processing only one job at a time, no mat-
ter how little of the computer's core capacity the job required.
As a result, early computer networks were highly centralized.
A large central computer, called a "mainframe," was the center
of operations and could only receive data physically carried to
it from outlying users. While this system differed from net-
work broadcasting in the sense that information was brought
to the center to be processed rather than being originated at
the center and generated to the periphery, it shared with net-
work broadcasting its centralized character. In this context, a
scarcity argument might have been appropriate.
In the past fifteen years the characteristics of information-
processing networks have changed. Rapid technological devel-
opment during this period has fundamentally changed the re-
lationship between the computer and its users. One major
breakthrough was the development of input and output de-
vices, called "terminals," which a computer user could install
at the site of his business and use to transmit and receive data
directly to and from a computer at a remote location. "Because
computers and communications facilities operate electroni-
cally, they formed a beautifully-meshed transmission system
that eliminates the burden and costs of having human labor
code messages for electronic transmission at one end and de-
code them after reception at the other.' 2
3
20. See supra text accompanying note 15.
21. 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1969).
22. See, e.g., Note, The FCC Computer Inquiry: Interfaces of Competitive and Reg-
ulated Markets, 71 MICH. L. REV. 172, 173-76 (1972) and the sources cited therein.
23. Id. See also S. NoRA & A. Mruc, THE COMPU'rERIZATION OF' SOCIETY, (1980). The
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While remote terminals made the computer accessible wher-
ever a telephone or telegraph line was available, a serious con-
straint on processing still remained. The main advantage of
remote terminal hookups-speed in gaining access to the com-
puter-was vitiated by the fact that a user attempting to gain
access to a central computer by such remote terminals fre-
quently encountered hours of "busy signals" while waiting for
others to complete their work. Consequently, it was often
cheaper and more efficient to continue to send data from re-
mote offices to the computer by mail or some other manual
means, rather than to have expensive terminal equipment
standing idle.24 Another major breakthrough, time-sharing
technology, significantly altered this situation. Computer
scientists developed new hardware and software that enabled
newer computers to process several jobs at once.
The ability of newer computers to receive inputs simultane-
ously from many remote terminals made clear the importance
of the telephone and telegraph links which tied outlying termi-
nals to the central computer. While such networks could still
be most accurately described as "starshaped," the centralized
character of the information-processing network, and any po-
tential scarcity argument to which such a system might have
given rise, had begun to change forever. The introduction of
the microcomputer and the advent of commercial time-sharing
began to speed a change in the shape of the network from a
system resembling a "star" to one resembling an intercon-
nected "web."25
When the "home computer"26 was born it created the possi-
bility of fully distributed information-processing networks and
the potential marketplace for "electronic publishing."27 For
the price of an expensive stereo set, an individual or small
business can now afford an information-processing system
which would have been the envy of a large business enterprise
a decade ago. One example of the direction future develop-
Nora-Minc volume, at 15-29, is a translation of L'INFORMATISATION DE LA SOCIETE (1978),
a report prepared for the French Government. Three documentary volumes supple-
menting this work will be published by Editions Seiul (La Documentation Francaise);
for a summary of these volumes see id. 144-48.
24. See supra note 23.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., R. PERRY, OWNING YOUR HOME COMPUTER (1980).
27. See id. at 13-241; C. EVANS, THE MICRO MILLENNIUM 108-45 (1979); Scholl, Vide-
otex Revolution, BAMON'S, Aug. 2, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
No. 11
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ments may take, the integrated video terminal (ITV), which
combines a television display screen, a video cassette recorder,
a printer, a telephone modem or connecting device, and a home
computer, has now become available.28
This combination of advancing technology and fierce com-
mercial competition has changed the shape of the information-
processing world. No longer do information processing sys-
tems consist merely of a central computer which is the site of
all data processing, and for whose use each patron must pa-
tiently wait his turn. Home computers make possible increas-
ingly complex information-management in the home or office
thereby decentralizing the control of that information. At the
same time, information can now be shunted around by tele-
phone, telegraph or over other media so that it can be more
easily bought and sold like other commodities. 29 The national
information network now begins to resemble a loosely knit
web of information-processing systems. And this develop-
ment, while obviating any arguments over scarcity, creates
new problems of access and control over the "publication" of
electronically-stored information.
As the fixed cost of information-processing ° goes down, in-
formation providers' "goods" will become relatively more valu-
able." Traditional print publishers seem to be well-positioned
to take advantage of this historic development. In order to do
so, however, those electronic publishers who do not have con-
flicting interests by virtue of being the proprietors of cable net-
works or satellite transponders may wish to argue for a
Tornillo -like standard 2 with regard to the control of content in
their data bases. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo ,"
a unanimous United States Supreme Court found that "[t]he
choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions
made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and
treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or
unfair--constitute the exercise of editorial control and judg-
ment. ' The Court firmly rejected the proposition that govern-
ment regulation of these processes could "be exercised
28. Financial Times (London), Dec. 1, 1981, at 17 (advertisement).
29. See, e.g., C. EVANS, supra note 27, at 112-21; S. NoRA & A. MINC, supra note 23.
30. E.g., the costs of hardware, software and computer time.
31. S. NoRA & A. MiNc, supra note 23, at 30-82.
32. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
33. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
34. Id. at 258.
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consistent with the First Amendment guarantees of a free
press as they have evolved to this time."3 But, as we shall see
in a moment, the answer may not be so simple if the context is
one of electronic publication rather than one of print.
If electronic publishers win first amendment protection for
the integrity of their data-bases, for their right to be editors as
well as publishers, they must still insure that they will be able
to distribute that information to end-users.
With that goal in mind, electronic publishers may wish to ar-
gue for common carriage rights of access to whatever networks
are available for information distribution. 6 Such access, of
course, is already available over current common carriers, but
not over cable, or over the broadcast medium of the vertical
blanking interval.
3
However, the courts have never found a general right of pub-
lic access either to the broadcast media or to cable operations.
In CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,38 the United
States Supreme Court rejected the notion that the first amend-
ment requires broadcasters to sell time to private persons who
wish to broadcast their political views. 9 Similarly, in FCC v.
Midwest Video Corp.," the Court struck down FCC rules
which required proprietors of cable systems to provide access
to members of the general public on the ground that these
rules exceeded the FCC's authority.4' It is unclear, therefore,
how the courts will treat claims of right to access over media
other than common carriage as electronic publication comes
on stream. It seems highly likely, however, that this will be a
conflict-ridden area.
IV
Regulation of Electronic Publishing Under the
Communications Act of 1934
Because electronic publishing makes use of electronic media
of distribution, it may be subject to the Communications Act of
1934, the FCC regulations which interpret the Act, and any suc-
35. Id.
36. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
37. Neustadt, Skall & Hammer, infra note 58.
38. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
39. Id. at 101-104, 121-170.
40. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
41. Id. at 708.
No. 11
COMM/ENT L. J.
cessor acts, such as one currently under consideration in the
Congress. 42 Under the rationale that the electronic media are
either "natural monopolies, ' 43 such as telephone and telegraph
systems, or make use of a "valuable and scarce public re-
source, " 44 such as the broadcast spectrum, courts have consist-
ently upheld the Communications Act against first amendment
challenges. 45 For example, the United States Supreme Court
has upheld licensing and market entry regulations for broad-
casters as regulation in the public interest. 6 These regulations
require broadcasters to "ascertain community needs, '47 to pro-
vide programming on controversial public issues and to pres-
ent contrasting viewpoints if one side of a controversial issue is
broadcast.48 In addition, the Supreme Court has upheld restric-
tions on the ownership of broadcast stations and has held over-
the-air broadcasters to a stricter obscenity-indecency standard
than print publishers, 49 citing the pervasiveness of the broad-
cast medium and its intrusion into the home. 0
Insofar as it is labelled "broadcasting," over-the-air teletext
may well be subject to many of these controls. The FCC, how-
ever, has tentatively decided that teletext will not be subject to
the "fairness" 1 and "equal time" rules.52
A. Electronic Publication via Cable
The rules governing cable TV are in a state of flux. The
FCC's broad claim to regulatory authority over cable by virtue
42. S. 898, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. §§ 101-409 (1981).
43. This traditional doctrine has given way under the impact of new technologies
which provide alternative sources of common carriage. See, e.g., Allocation of Micro-
wave Frequencies Above 890 Mc, 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959); Specialized Common Carrier
Decision, 29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1971), affid sub. nom. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v.
FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v.
FCC, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
44. See supra text accompanying note 15.
45. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); CBS,
Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
46. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945) (upholding 47 U.S.C. § 309
(1976)).
47. See, e.g., WGN of Colorado, Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 413 (1931).
48. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding 47
U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976)); see also Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974).
49. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
50. Id. at 727.
51. See supra note 19.
52. F.C.C. May Exclude the Electronic Press from Fairness Rules, N.Y. Times, Dec.
4, 1981, at A24, col. 1.
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of cable's "ancillary" status to over-the-air broadcasting 3 has
been significantly eroded by recent court decisions.54 In FCC v.
Midwest Video Corp.,5  for example, the United States
Supreme Court invalidated the FCC's mandatory access rules
which had required cable systems to make channels available
on a first-come, non-discriminatory basis and free from edito-
rial control.56 These rules, the Court found, imposed "common
carrier" obligations on cable operators and thus exceeded the
FCC's "ancillary" authority to regulate cable television .5  The
FCC's authority to preempt local and state regulation of cable
operators, however, remains unsettled.5 8 However, the FCC
still imposes content regulations and a few economic rules on
cable operators, some states regulate cable, and most local ju-
risdictions impose extensive rate and structural controls
through the franchising process.
B. State and Local Regulation of Electronic Publication over Cable:
The Preemption Problem
As the FCC begins to withdraw from the regulation of cable
TV, state and local content and access controls are likely to be-
come more important. Not only have some jurisdictions al-
ready imposed content rules in their franchising
requirements, 59 but many demand mandatory access channels
as well.60 In addition, electronic "publication" over cable may
be affected by local laws on obscenity, defamation and
privacy.
61
Local and state abridgement of the electronic publisher's
first amendment rights is likely to evolve as a serious problem
53. While the FCC has no direct jurisdiction over cable television, the Supreme
Court has held that the FCC has such jurisdiction under the Communications Act as is
"reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various re-
sponsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting." United States v. South-
western Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
54. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 440 U.S. 689
(1979).
55. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
56. Id. at 689, 699-702.
57. Id. See generally, Hanks and Coran, Federal Preemption of State Obscenity
Law Applied to Broadcasting, 5 CoMM/Err L.J. 21 (1982).
58. For a discussion of this problem see Neustadt, Skall & Hammer, The Regulation
of Electronic Publishing, 33 FED. COM. L.J. 331, 385-92 (1981).
59. See supra note 14.
60. New York City is an example. See, e.g., Is Public Access TV Doing Its Job? N.Y.
Times, Aug. 22, 1982 § 2, at 1, col. 1.
61. See, e.g., D. Nash & J. Smith, infra note 73.
No. 11
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to the extent that state and local cable regulation is not pre-
empted by the FCC.6 2 Concessions on content by cable opera-
tors have most often been made during the franchising
process. Because this is the case, it may be difficult to find a
successful cable franchisee who is willing to risk offending lo-
cal authorities by bringing a first amendment claim. Further-
more, state and local support for such content restrictions is
likely to have a "chilling effect" 63 on the "publication" of cer-
tain sorts of information over cable even in the absence of for-
mal prohibitions, and any statutory prohibition on the
publication of certain information over cable may constitute a
"prior restraint,"' in violation of the first amendment.
FCC content regulation currently distinguishes between
origination-cablecast-programming, over which the cable oper-
ator has "exclusive control," and programming transmitted
over "access channels."65 "Origination cablecasting" remains
subject to a variety of content controls.66 "Access channels,"
on the other hand, are now completely free of FCC content reg-
ulation.67 As a result, to the extent that information provided
by electronic publishers over cable is considered "program-
62. See Neustadt, Skall & Hammer, supra note 58, at 385-92.
63. The metaphor of the "chilling effect" refers to the judicially-expressed concern
that constitutionally protected speech will be withheld because of the threat of crimi-
nal or civil sanctions. "If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after
publication 'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it at least for the time." Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
64. Any restraint on expression prior to its publication while "not unconstitutional
per se," Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975) (emphasis in
original), is presumptively unconstitutional. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). Any party seeking such a "prior
restraint" must show that the expression to be prohibited "fit[s] within one of the
narrowly defined exceptions to the prohibition against prior restraints, and.., must
have been accomplished with procedural safeguards that reduce the danger of sup-
pressing constitutionally protected speech." 420 U.S. at 558-559. See generally ABRAMS,
PRIOR REsTRAINTs, NNm ANNuAL COMM-UlNCATIONs LAW INsTrrUTE, PRACTISING LAw IN-
sTrrurrE 775-810 (1981). See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) for a
thorough discussion.
65. The FCC distinguishes between "origination cable-casting"-programming
over which the cable operator has "exclusive control"-and programming "controlled
by others." 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(w) (1981).
66. Origination channels may not carry obscene or indecent matter, or advertising
that lacks sponsorship identification. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.215, 76.221 (1981). Nor may such
channels carry lottery information on non-state run lotteries. 47 C.F.R. § 76.213 (1981).
Origination channels are also subject to the equal opportunity requirements for polit-
ical candidates, and are subject to the Fairness Doctrine. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.205, 76.209
(1981).
67. 47 C.F.R. § 76.254, deleted by Order in Docket 20508, 83 F.C.C.2d 147 (1980).
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ming," rather than some other form of communication or infor-
mation-processing, these rules may have a significant effect.
However, technological developments have obscured the
seemingly simple distinction between "origination cablecast-
ing" and the mere provision of "access." Many cable systems
now purchase programming from satellites and pass it through
without alteration to subscribers on a "pay" or "fee" basis.
Since the proprietor of the cable system has purchased the
programming before sending it on to his subscribers, it may
"belong" to him, and therefore be subject to content regulation
under the "origination" doctrine. If, on the other hand, the
cable operator has merely licensed his system for use by the
satellite distributor, then the programming has "originated"
with the distributor and is immune from content regulation.
The importance of having this ambiguity resolved cannot be
overstressed. Inasmuch as electronic publishing makes use of
the cable system, the nature of the first amendment protection
which it can claim will depend on whether its provision of in-
formation through the cable system is defined as "program-
ming" and, if it is so defined, with whom such programming
will be found to have "originated."
The FCC has tentatively decided that over-the-air teletext is
an "ancillary" service, rather than "broadcasting," and is,
therefore, not subject to the fairness and equal time rules im-
posed on radio and television.6 8
C. Electronic Publication Over the Multipoint Distribution
System (MDS)
One form of over-the-air teletext may be exempt from fed-
eral content controls. The FCC has ruled that the Multipoint
Distribution System (MDS), which operates on over-the-air
frequencies which require special decoders, is a "common car-
rier. ' 69 MDS operators presently contract with program sup-
pliers to deliver television to subscribing homes and
apartments on channels that could easily be used to provide
broadcast teletext. ° The presently available spectrum for MDS
68. See supra note 52.
69. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 21.900-21.908 (1981).
70. MDS operators contract with program suppliers to deliver television program-
ming to subscribing homes and apartments for a monthly fee. The program is carried
on a scramble signal, on radio frequencies assigned by the FCC. Subscribers receive a
signal decoder as part of their subscription fee.
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is quite limited, however, and the FCC sharply restricts the
number of licensees in each market.7' Normally, the MDS li-
censee leases his entire channel to a company to provide pro-
gramming. However, it is possible that the vertical blanking
interval (VBI) portion of the channel over which MDS teletext
is broadcast could be leased to one entity and the remainder of
the channel to another.7 2 Since most of the content rules appli-
cable to over-the-air broadcasting and to cable do not apply to
common carriage, teletext broadcasting over MDS channels
will likely be exempt from those regulations.
D. Electronic Publication via Telephone
The telephone network is the only two-way communication
network currently available to most people, although the
spread of interactive cable systems may eventually provide an
attractive alternative.73 For the remainder of the decade, how-
ever, telephone networks will continue as the principal me-
dium for videotex. Under the Communications Act,74 the
telephone company, as a monopoly, is subject to rate and other
regulations, and must make its facilities available to the public
at large.75
The only Federal content regulation currently affecting tele-
phone-delivered videotex is a criminal prohibition on the use
of the telephone to make "any comment, request, suggestion,
or proposal which is lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent. ''7 6 Al-
though this provision has not been tested under the first
amendment, it could hinder the use of telephone-delivered
videotex in obvious ways. The key issue in this area, of course,
is not so much how telephone videotex will be regulated, but
whether AT&T will be permitted to become a provider of infor-
71. The FCC currently permits only two licensees per major market, but recent
proposals would significantly increase the number of frequencies over which MDS
could be distributed. See Notices of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 45 Fed. Reg.
29,350 (1980).
72. A variety of copyright and other issues could arise in this context. See WGN
Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ill. 1981). See
also Broadcasters Lose in First Cable-Copyright Case, Legal Times of Washington,
Oct. 19, 1981, at 1, col. 2.
73. See, e.g., D. NASH & J. SMrrH, INTERACTIVE HoME MEDIA AND PRIVACY 33-53
(1981) (prepared for Office of Policy Planning, Federal Trade Commission); A. SMITH,
supra note 1 at 274-78.
74. 47 U.S.C. § 154 (1976).
75. Id.
76. 47 U.S.C. § 233 (1976).
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mation over the telephone system-that is to say, an electronic
"publisher.""7
V
Some Hypothetical Problems: Extrapolating from
the Present
The first amendment difficulties which must be anticipated
may be illustrated by several recent court decisions. For ex-
ample, in Official Airlines Guide Inc. v. FTC,78 the Reuben H.
Donnelly Corporation, which publishes the Official Airline
Guide (OAG) was charged by the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) with several antitrust violations, including unfairly re-
fusing to publish connecting flight schedules of commuter air-
lines. An FTC administrative law judge (ALJ) ordered
Donnelly Corporation to change the order in which it pub-
lished certain information in the OAG, notwithstanding the
publisher's first amendment objections.79
The case was subsequently reviewed by the full Commis-
sion. In this proceeding, the Donnelly Corporation cited
Tornillo in arguing that the ALJ's order amounted to editorial
supervision of the OAG and therefore violated the first amend-
77. [Editor's Note: this question has been largely resolved.]
United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. was settled after the author
had had an opportunity to make text revisions. See [July-Dec.], ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1077 (Aug. 12, 1982) (special supp.). The Justice Department and
AT&T reached a settlement and submitted it to district court Judge Greene for ap-
proval. In his opinion of August 11, 1982, Judge Greene refused to approve the settle-
ment unless the parties agreed to ten modifications.
One such modification would prohibit AT&T from engaging in electronic publishing
over its own transmission facilities. However, the prohibition would expire in seven
years. Id. at 317.
In part VI of his opinion, Judge Greene felt that anticompetitive considerations
alone would justify barring AT&T from the electronic publishing industry. In addition,
he recognized that AT&T's entry into the electronic publishing market would pose a
"substantial danger" to first amendment values. He argued that the first amendment
protects diversity in sources and in dissemination of information and that permitting
AT&T to become an electronic publisher would not further these public interests. Id.
at S-47-S-53 (special supp.).
The parties agreed to Judge Greene's terms, with little protest, on August 26, 1982.
Id. at 380. AT&T may manufacture and market equipment for electronic publishers
and may perform certain limited electronic publishing services such as product and
homeowner directory services. Id. at S-47-S-53 (special supp.).
78. 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980).




ment.80 Citing cases in the area of commercial speech, the FTC
countered that the Supreme Court "[had] not raised commer-
cial speech on [sic] the same level of protection as noncom-
mercial speech,8 1 [and that] the Court [had] reaffirmed the
necessity of regulating false, deceptive or misleading
speech."82 While acknowledging that the OAG, though a direc-
tory rather than a newspaper, was entitled to full first amend-
ment protection, the Commission nonetheless dismissed the
publication's first amendment argument and ordered it to
make the requested editorial changes. 83 The Commission fur-
ther found that Donnelly Corporation's listing policy was mis-
leading.84 On appeal,85 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed the Commission's order on the ground that
monopolistic publishers of airline schedules have no duty not
to discriminate between certified air carriers and commuter
lines.86 The Court of Appeals, however, failed to address im-
portant first amendment issues regarding control of a printed
data-base. 7
While at first glance the Second Circuit's decision appears
unrelated to the problems of electronic publication, consider
how much more difficult the problem would have been had the
information in the OAG been stored in a computer rather than
in a bound guide, and been retrieved electronically over a com-
mon carrier, or received by broadcast teletext, rather than pub-
lished in book form. Under such circumstances it is unclear to
what level of first amendment protection the Guide would
have been entitled. Conceivably, the answer would depend to
some extent on the medium over which the information had
been "published," with the greatest protection being afforded
for publication over telephone, and the least for broadcast
teletext, with publication over cable falling somewhere in be-
80. 95 F.T.C. at 85.
81. 95 F.T.C. at 45, 86 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456
(1978)).
82. 95 F.T.C. at 45 (citing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
83. 95 F.T.C. at 84-86.
84. 95 F.T.C. at 84.
85. Donnelly ified a petition for review to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals pur-
suant to section 5(c) and (d) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (c)-(d), 630 F.2d 920, 923
(1980).
86. Id. at 920.
87. Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 630 F.2d 920, 921 (2d
Cir. 1980).
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tween. It is unclear, furthermore, whether the first amend-
ment protections available for printed commercial speech
would have been available in such a case, and whether, if
printed in hard-copy after having been initially retrieved elec-
tronically, the information would have benefited from the
Tornillo standard.
Other, different problems are also likely to arise. The first
amendment protects more than freedom of speech and of the
press; 8 it guarantees freedom of religion and assembly as
well.8 9 A second example, concerning the Christian Yellow
Pages,90 demonstrates the problems that arise when different
first amendment values come into conflict. How they will be
resolved when electronic publishing comes fully "on-stream"
is uncertain. The publishers of the Christian Yellow Pages, a
business directory for "born-again" Christians, adopted a pol-
icy of excluding Jewish-owned businesses from the directory.
The publishers asserted their first amendment rights of
speech, of the press, and of association and religion, and
claimed that the Consitution guaranteed them the right to pub-
lish a business directory which excluded non-believers. The
Jewish merchants, on the other hand, regarded their exclusion
from the directory as a form of religious discrimination.
Had the directory been distributed electronically, the rights
asserted by the excluded merchants might very well have out-
weighed the first amendment rights of the publisher. In the
more traditional print context, however, this certainly would
not be the case.
These examples illustrate the tangled nature of the first
amendment issues which electronic "publication" will confront
absent a clarification of the access and data-base control is-
sues. First amendment and regulatory doctrines which have
evolved as responses to the rise of print, telephony and broad-
casting are likely to be incomplete when faced with conflicts
arising over the use and control of videotex and teletext.
88. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech; or the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
89. Id.






Electronic publication using over-the-air broadcast signals
will likely be subject to the traditional rules governing radio
and television broadcasting, with the exceptions of the fairness
and equal time rules. However, those electronic publishers us-
ing the special wavelengths assigned for transmission over the
multipoint distribution system (MDS) will probably have
greater publishing freedom, since the MDS has been desig-
nated a "common carrier." MDS transmissions, however, may
be subject to regulation under state and local defamation, ob-
scenity and perhaps privacy statutes.
On the other hand, electronic publication over the telephone
network may be considered merely an "enhanced" form of
data processing under the FCC's Second Computer Inquiry de-
cision,9 rather than a medium of "broadcasting" or of "com-
mon carriage." If designated a form of data processing,
electronic publication would not be subject to current FCC reg-
ulation. However, the FCC has explicitly reserved the right to
regulate data processing in the future,92 although its authority
to do so is disputed.93 State and local obscenity, defamation
and privacy statutes will probably apply to electronic publica-
tion over the telephone network.
The status of electronic publication over coaxial cable is un-
clear. To the extent that cable teletext resembles broadcast-
ing, it may be subject to the FCC's "ancillary" jurisdiction.
However, interactive videotex transmitted over cable may be
exempt from FCC regulations as neither "broadcasting," nor
91. Docket No. 20828, Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384; Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980). In the Second Computer Inquiry, the FCC discarded the
First Computer Inquiry's distinction between "data" and "communications" and
adopted a new line of demarcation between "basic services" and "enhanced services."
Basic services are defined as the "common carrier offering of transmission capacity
for the movement of information between two or more points," 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-223
(1976).
Enhanced services which are not subject to regulation under Title II, are defined as:
[SI ervices, offered over common carrier transmission facilities used in inter-
state communications, which employ computer processing applications that
act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's
transmitted information . . . or involve subscriber interaction with stored
information.
47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (1981).
92. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
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"ancillary" to broadcasting.94
Current federal content rules governing cable television may
also govern electronic publication over cable, depending on
whether cable transmission is subject to FCC jurisdiction and
whether the published information is subject to the cable oper-
ator's "control." FCC cable regulations continue to distinguish
between "origination cablecasting," over which the cable oper-
ator has "exclusive control," and programming controlled by
others. "Origination cablecasting" is subject to the fairness
doctrine,9" the personal attack corollary,96 and the FCC's polit-
ical broadcasting rules;97 "programming" is not. Also, origina-
tion channels may not carry obscene or indecent matter,
advertising that lacks sponsorship identification or lottery
announcements. 98
"Access channels" used by public groups,99 are not subject to
the content rules governing "origination cablecasting." State
and local obscenity, defamation and possibly privacy statutes
would, however, apply.
It seems clear that first amendment doctrines developed
before the current information-processing and communica-
tions revolutions may be inadequate to deal with the issues of
access and control which are certain to emerge as the uses of
these new technologies proliferate. Careful consideration of
these problems, and an attempt to anticipate them by legisla-
tion and regulatory clarification is necessary.
94. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
99. FCC rules requiring cable systems to set aside channels for access by the pub-
lic, local officials and other leased-access users have been overturned as not "reason-
ably ancillary" to the Commission's authority over broadcasting. Midwest Video Corp.
v. FCC, 440 U.S. 689 (1979). Access channels which cable systems make available vol-
untarily, however, are not subject to the FCC's program content rules.
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